The role of funding portals as signaling offering quality in investment crowdfunding

Pablo de Andrés, Ricardo Correia, Álvaro Rezola and Nuria Suárez

Finance Research Letters, 2022, vol. 46, issue PA

Abstract: We examine the effect of the issuer fee paid to portals on the success of investment crowdfunding using 1,694 offerings launched in the US during May 2016 – September 2019. We show that a mixed issuer fee (i.e. fixed gross fee and a share of securities) influences the probability of success, suggesting a positive signaling-effect that mitigates adverse selection problems between retail investors and issuers. Specifically, the use of a mixed issuer fee increases the probability of success by 33.5%. This effect remains after controlling for other information-risk-reducing mechanisms and it is contingent on firm-level characteristics.

Keywords: Investment crowdfunding success; Adverse selection; Signaling effects; Issuer fee structure; JOBS Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:46:y:2022:i:pa:s1544612321003470

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102355

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