Executive team heterogeneity and the moral hazard of equity pledging: Evidence from China

Yue Yuan

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 52, issue C

Abstract: This study empirically examines the relationship between executive team heterogeneity and equity pledge moral hazard using data about Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020. We find that increasing top management team heterogeneity (including financial background, overseas background, educational background, gender, and age) can significantly reduce equity pledge moral hazard, while also finding a moderating effect from executive compensation. Our research can help listed companies manage the moral hazards associated with equity pledges from the perspective of the executive team, such as personnel arrangements and compensation adjustments.

Keywords: Executive management team heterogeneity; Equity pledge; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612322005487
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:52:y:2023:i:c:s1544612322005487

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103371

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().