Directors appointment of non-largest shareholders and related-party transactions

Songqiao Qi and Tianmin Sun

Finance Research Letters, 2023, vol. 58, issue PC

Abstract: This paper selects state-owned enterprises listed from 2010 to 2020 as the research object and analyzes the impact of non-largest shareholders appointing non-independent directors on the previous significant shareholders' related-party transactions behaviors prevalent in state-owned enterprises. It is found that in the realization mechanism of mixed reform, the appointment of non-independent directors by non-largest shareholders can significantly reduce the number of related-party transactions of listed companies; compared with the state-owned non-largest shareholders, the appointment of non-independent directors by non-state-owned first major shareholders has a significant inhibiting effect on the related-party transactions behavior of listed companies.

Keywords: Related-party transactions; Non-first shareholder; Appointed director (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:58:y:2023:i:pc:s1544612323009844

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104612

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