Interlocked executives’ bad reputation in the labor market

Ning Tang, Jianqiang Chen, Chih-Yung Lin and Le Quoc Tuan

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 59, issue C

Abstract: This study investigates whether executives who concurrently hold director positions in other firms undergoing reputation-damaging incidents, such as fraud, are more likely to face forced turnovers. Using logistic regression with a matched sample, we find an increased likelihood of CEOs being replaced when their director-position interlocked firms go through negative events. The labor market further penalizes such executives, as the probability is lower for them to keep their current positions and gain new board seats in the future. The results are stronger for firms with higher external governance.

Keywords: Corporate networks; Interlocking directorates; Managerial turnovers; Fraud; Ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 M40 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612323011601
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:59:y:2024:i:c:s1544612323011601

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104788

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().