EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do anticipated government environmental audits improve firm productivity? Evidence from China

Jianhua Tan, Min Hua and Kam C. Chan

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 61, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the impacts of anticipated government environmental audits (GEAs) on firm productivity. We use a 2009 policy set forth by China's National Audit Office that required GEAs of local governments as an exogenous event to examine the effect of the policy announcement on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). Our difference-in-differences tests indicate that TFP in heavily polluting firms improved more than other firms’ TFP after the announcement of the policy. We also find that to raise TFP, firms engage in green invention patents or receive government environmental subsidies. In addition, our cross-sectional analysis suggests that firms in regions where governments have strong environmental enforcement or that are in the eastern regions of China increase TFP more.

Keywords: Government environmental audits; Total factor productivity; Enforcement; Public attention; Green factor productivity; The Porter hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612324000151
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:61:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324000151

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.104985

Access Statistics for this article

Finance Research Letters is currently edited by R. Gençay

More articles in Finance Research Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:61:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324000151