Reduced executive shareholdings and corporate green innovation

Gefei Han and Yanjun Luo

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 62, issue PB

Abstract: This paper uses 2016–2022 data for China's A-share listed companies to explore the effects of reduced shareholdings by executives (RSE) on corporate green innovation (CGI). RSE behavior and CGI are found to be significantly negatively correlated. Further, greater internal control and higher agency costs for listed companies reduce the inhibition of CGI resulting from RSE.

Keywords: Agency cost; Corporate green innovation; Executive shareholding reduction; Internal control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:62:y:2024:i:pb:s1544612324002356

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105205

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