Do co-opted boards protect CEOs from ESG controversies?

Abdul Ghafoor and Ammar Gull ()

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 63, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between board co-option and ESG controversies using a large sample of U.S. firms from 2002 to 2018. Contrary to prior studies documenting the potential consequences of co-opted boards on organizational outcomes, we document the positive role of co-opted directors. Specifically, the CEOs of firms with a higher proportion of co-opted directors are subject to fewer ESG controversies. Our findings provide significant implications for stakeholders, redirecting the narrative on board co-option.

Keywords: Board co-option; Esg (environmental, social and governance) controversies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:63:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324002939

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105263

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