Executive network centrality and corporate merger and acquisition efficiency: A governance effect or collusion effect?

Ceng Hou and Beiwei Li

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 63, issue C

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the impact of executive network centrality on corporate merger and acquisition efficiency by constructing an empirical econometric model. The research results show that the enhancement of executive network centrality is conducive to the governance effect, thereby significantly improving the efficiency of corporate mergers and acquisitions. The results of heterogeneity analysis indicate that the role of executive network centrality in enhancing corporate merger and acquisition efficiency is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with political connections.

Keywords: Executive network centrality; Corporate merger and acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:63:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324003866

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105356

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