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How do property rights affect corporate ESG performance? The moderating effect of green innovation efficiency

Chaofan Chen, Wen-Bo Li and Heng Zhang

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 64, issue C

Abstract: Data from China's A-share listed companies indicates that property rights (PR) significantly influence Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance, with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) outperforming non-SOEs. The state-owned shareholding ratio (SSR) does not linearly correlate with higher ESG performance. Instead, a non-linear threshold effect is observed, and maintaining SSR below 42 % significantly enhances ESG performance. Additionally, green innovation efficiency (GIE) moderates the impact of PR on ESG performance, and the increase in GIE exacerbates the disparity in ESG performance between SOEs and non-SOEs. Compared to the efficiency of applying green tech achievements, green tech R&D efficiency has a more pronounced moderating effect.

Keywords: Property rights; ESG performance; State-owned shareholding ratio; Green innovation efficiency; Three-stage DEA-SBM model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:64:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324005063

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105476

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