Directors assigned by non-state shareholders and innovation in state-owned enterprises

Chenxi Wang, Ran Duan and Xingguang Pan

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 66, issue C

Abstract: This paper selects a sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022 to study the impact of non-state shareholders' assigned directors' governance on innovation activities and performance. It is found that assigned directors from non-state shareholders can effectively promote innovative R&D inputs and outputs of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that political affiliation can positively regulate the overall impact of assigned directors from non-state shareholders on the improvement of the innovation level of SOEs.

Keywords: Assigned directors by non-state shareholders; Innovation of state-owned enterprises; Political affiliat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:66:y:2024:i:c:s1544612324006780

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105648

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