Compensation stickiness and firms' innovative capacity

Zhe Tao and Hanchao Liu

Finance Research Letters, 2024, vol. 69, issue PA

Abstract: This paper selects data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2022 for empirical analysis. The empirical findings show that pay stickiness has a significant negative impact on the innovation ability of enterprises. There is a difference in the impact of pay stickiness on the innovation ability of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises; the independence of the board of directors can inhibit the negative effect of the stickiness of the executives' pay on the innovation ability of the enterprise. The research results of this paper provide valuable insights for enterprises in formulating compensation strategies.

Keywords: Pay stickiness; Innovation; Board independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finlet:v:69:y:2024:i:pa:s1544612324010936

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.106063

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