 Assessing the systemic risk impact of bank bail-insChristoph Siebenbrunner, Martin Hafner-Guth, Ralph Spitzer and Stefan Trappl Journal of Financial Stability, 2024, vol. 71, issue C Abstract: Financial regulation has introduced bail-ins (i.e. enforced debt-to-equity swaps) as a tool for orderly bank resolution, and hence it is the authorities’ task to decide when to apply this tool in a resolution. We present a quantitative framework to support this decision by computing the systemic impact of a bail-in. Our model takes into account systemic feedback effects using state-of-the-art multilayer contagion models, which we extend to include liquidation losses. Using real-world data for the Austrian banking system, we perform an empirical assessment of the systemic risk impact of idiosyncratic and systemic shocks. Our results show that bail-ins have the potential to reduce systemic risk compared to insolvencies for the Austrian banking system. They also incur lower social cost than bail-outs, but only for moderate, idiosyncratic crises. Our findings quantitatively corroborate earlier discussions that bail-ins may be an inadequate tool to deal with systemic crises. This suggests that the bail-in mechanism alone may not be sufficient to rule out future bail-outs. Keywords: Systemic risk; Contagion; Bail-in; Bank failures; Banking regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:finsta:v:71:y:2024:i:c:s1572308924000147 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101229 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Financial Stability is currently edited by I. Hasan, W. C. Hunter and G. G. Kaufman More articles in Journal of Financial Stability from Elsevier |
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