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Decision making processes and power dynamics in timber production co-management: A comparative analysis of seven Brazilian Amazonian community-based projects

Ana Luiza Violato Espada and Karen A. Kainer

Forest Policy and Economics, 2024, vol. 159, issue C

Abstract: Power asymmetries are a major obstacle to inclusive and robust decision making in collaborative management (or co-management), whereby multiple actors, principally government and local communities, jointly make decisions to achieve natural resource management goals. We compared seven community-based timber projects under different co-management arrangements within three Brazilian Amazonian extractive reserves to illuminate how decision making was organized (structure) and how it actually operated (function) with respect to power dynamics among multiple actors. Over a 15-month field season, we conducted participant observation and 52 semistructured interviews, systematically analyzed over 30 key timber management decision-making meetings, and employed Q-methodology to ascertain diverse actor perspectives of power dynamics. Our overall analysis revealed that decisions across all seven timber projects were gradually made through multiple meetings at community, extractive reserve, and beyond extractive reserve levels – a positive approach that can lead to continuous problem-solving. The 16 Q-sorters perceived decision making in these meetings to be participative, respectful of all actors' rights to speak, and allowed for some knowledge exchange, suggesting that unequal power dynamics (as observed in our study) does not necessarily prevent the opportunity to voice one's opinion. This participation also decentralized decision-making processes, boosting chances that community-level actors used their crucial local knowledge and advocated for their interests. Still, in one reserve, community members were ill prepared to make informed decisions, lacking sufficient technical training and trusted long-term support from non-governmental external actors. Furthermore, some Q-sorters noted insufficient community-level actors in decision-making processes, because deliberative spaces were beyond their physical reach. Yet in two reserves, innovative logistical strategies were developed to compensate and accommodate this challenge. In the third reserve, however, in the absence of intentional and creative solutions to geographical and cultural distances, there were limited interactions among the communities and external actors, giving rise to minimal information flow and weakened representation of community interests in decision making. We also demonstrated that actors in power (government forest administration officers) or those with perceived power (financial or forest technical providers, community leaders), sometimes acted strategically over other actors, particularly those perceived as without power (community residents), to alter their behavior, constrain their choices, and influence their expectations regarding decision outcomes. We conclude that power asymmetries can be overcome in natural resource co-management decision making, using deliberate, thoughtful, and creative participatory approaches.

Keywords: Community forest management; Extractive reserves; Sustainable use reserves; Q-methodology; Power asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:forpol:v:159:y:2024:i:c:s1389934123002162

DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2023.103121

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