Can outnumbered negotiators succeed? The case of intercultural business negotiations

Elena Dinkevych, Robert Wilken, Tayfun Aykac, Frank Jacob and Nathalie Prime

International Business Review, 2017, vol. 26, issue 3, 592-603

Abstract: Culture likely affects the choice of negotiation strategies significantly, and culture-dependent preferences for negotiation strategies could lead to conflict when negotiations cross borders. Negotiators often regard some degree of adaptation to the culture of their negotiation partner as a solution to such conflicts. The authors test this suggested solution in an asymmetric setting, in which a solo (outnumbered) negotiator faces a team. Two studies that employ web-based negotiation simulations show that only solo negotiators adapt to the negotiation strategies of their team counterpart. In a third study that uses a symmetric (solo–solo) setting, the adaptation effect disappears. These studies thus illustrate the greater social impact of teams versus solo negotiators. For outnumbered negotiators, adaptation is particularly beneficial (i.e., increases negotiation profit) if it involves an increased use of integrative strategies. The degree to which negotiators succeed in intercultural negotiations thus depends on their counterpart’s (team’s) culture.

Keywords: Intercultural business negotiations; Negotiation behavior; Social impact theory; Behavioral adaptation; Collectivism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.12.001

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