 Effects of vertical integration on internet service providers’ zero-rating choiceFuyuki Saruta Information Economics and Policy, 2022, vol. 61, issue C Abstract: This study presents investigation of the effects of vertical integration between an internet service provider (ISP) and a content provider (CP) on the ISP’s zero-rating choice and social welfare. We develop a simple model in which a monopolistic ISP delivers content from two CPs to a representative consumer. The ISP can offer zero-rating contracts to one or two CPs, thereby allowing the consumer to use zero-rated content without consuming monthly data usage. We investigate how integration between the ISP and a CP affects the ISP’s zero-rating choice and social welfare. Our findings are the following. First, the vertically integrated ISP might zero-rate the unaffiliated CP exclusively when the CPs’ profitability is not so low. Second, the integration increases the total surplus and the independent CP’s profit. Our results indicate that vertical integration is welfare enhancing and beneficial to the independent CP. Keywords: Mobile internet; Net neutrality; Sponsored data; Vertical integration; Zero-rating (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:61:y:2022:i:c:s0167624522000440 DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.101005 Access Statistics for this article Information Economics and Policy is currently edited by D. Waterman More articles in Information Economics and Policy from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.