Three things about mobile app commissions

Joshua S. Gans

Information Economics and Policy, 2024, vol. 69, issue C

Abstract: Mobile app commissions paid by app developers to a monopolist device maker/app store operator are examined. Three results are demonstrated. First, unregulated app commissions are set at a level that maximises consumer surplus. Second, eliminating app commissions will likely lead to higher device prices. Third, requiring a menu of options for consumers as to how device makers receive subsidies from app developers constrains app commissions in a way that provides a more equal balance between consumer versus app developer interests.

Keywords: Mobile apps; App store; Commission; Antitrust; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:69:y:2024:i:c:s0167624524000362

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101114

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