 Analysis of information flow security in cyber–physical systemsRavi Akella, Han Tang and Bruce M. McMillin International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2010, vol. 3, issue 3, 157-173 Abstract: Information flow is a fundamental concept underlying the security of a system. Confidentiality of information in a system can be breached through unrestricted information flow. Physical components added to a cyber system considerably increase the difficulty of determining information flow and the difficulty of mitigating the corresponding confidentiality problem. Fundamentally, physical actions inherently divulge information through simple observation. This work applies classical models of non-deducibility and non-inference to cyber–physical systems (CPSs) to determine information flow in the coupled cyber and physical worlds. The results demonstrate that the combined physical and cyber properties of a CPS can both protect and divulge information. The key to formalizing this analysis is to find a uniform semantic representation of the cyber and physical components, their interaction, and the physics of the system, and to devise a formal modeling technique for determining information flow. Keywords: Cyber–physical systems; Information flow; Non-inference; Non-deducibility; Gas pipelines; Smart grid (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:3:y:2010:i:3:p:157-173 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2010.09.001 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection is currently edited by Leon Strous More articles in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection from Elsevier |
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