An evaluation of modification attacks on programmable logic controllers

Carl Schuett, Jonathan Butts and Stephen Dunlap

International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2014, vol. 7, issue 1, 61-68

Abstract: Unprotected supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems offer promising targets to potential attackers. Field devices, such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), are of particular concern because they directly monitor and control industrial processes. Although attacks targeting SCADA systems have increased, relatively little research has focused on exploring the vulnerabilities directly associated with the exploitation of field devices. Attacks such as Stuxnet have targeted operating characteristics, but not low-level firmware code. As attacks increase in sophistication, it is reasonable to expect increased exploitation of the field device firmware.

Keywords: Industrial control systems; Programmable logic controllers; Firmware; Modification attacks; Reverse engineering; ARM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:7:y:2014:i:1:p:61-68

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2014.01.004

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