Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions

Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro and Helder Vasconcelos

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2014, vol. 33, issue C, 22-36

Abstract: Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

Keywords: Antitrust; Unilateral effects; Partial acquisitions; Oligopoly; Differentiated products; Demand estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C54 D12 L13 L41 L66 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:22-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.12.003

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