Mergers and coordinated effects

Robert Porter

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 73, issue C

Abstract: A merger is said to have coordinated effects if it results in more collusive outcomes. I review the theory of collusion, and the role played by communication in coordination. Mergers can affect the enforcement and participation constraints for a collusive agreement, and the selection from the equilibrium set of outcomes. I describe some recent empirical studies of the effects of mergers on collusion, and the underlying measurement issues associated with identifying the degree of coordination. I also discuss some recent cases in which coordinated effects were a concern, including both merger reviews and ex post investigations.

Keywords: Mergers; Coordinated effects; Collusion; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:73:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300059

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102583

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