Journal competition and the quality of published research: Simultaneous versus sequential screening

Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 76, issue C

Abstract: We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.

Keywords: Imperfect screening; Sequential submissions; Simultaneous submissions; Delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:76:y:2021:i:c:s0167718721000114

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718

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