Identification of English auctions when losing entrants are not observed

Yunmi Kong

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2022, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: A typical feature of English auctions and negotiated-price markets modeled as English auctions is that only the transaction price and identity of the winner are observed; auction entrants other than the winner are commonly not recorded in the data. Meanwhile, existing identification results for independent private values, including Athey and Haile (2002), require that the set of entrants be observed. This paper fills the gap by establishing nonparametric identification of asymmetric bidders’ value distributions when losing entrants are not observed, under a general class of entry models in which each potential entrant enters the auction with some bidder-specific probability.

Keywords: English auctions; Negotiated price markets; Entry; Unknown number of bidders; Nonparametric identification; Asymmetric bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718722000510
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:85:y:2022:i:c:s0167718722000510

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102875

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal

More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().