A partial identification framework for dynamic games

Jose Miguel Abito and Cuicui Chen

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2023, vol. 87, issue C

Abstract: Empirical work on strategic interactions is often subject to the critique that equilibrium selection assumptions drive the results. We develop a framework for partially identifying parameters of dynamic games without equilibrium selection assumptions. Our framework relies on incentive compatibility constraints that incorporate game theoretical results on equilibrium payoff sets to bound the unknown continuation payoffs. We apply this framework to identify cost parameters in three dynamic games where collusion is a potential outcome. The identified set demonstrates the ease of sustaining collusion with patient firms, in low demand and when monitoring is perfect, and can also be used to detect collusion.

Keywords: Dynamic games; Multiple equilibria; Equilibrium payoff set; Partial identification; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C7 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016771872200090X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:87:y:2023:i:c:s016771872200090x

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102915

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal

More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().