The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements

Emanuel Ornelas and John L. Turner

Journal of International Economics, 2024, vol. 147, issue C

Abstract: Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a strict rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.

Keywords: Hold-up problem; Sourcing; Incomplete contracts; Regionalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 F13 F15 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements (2022)
Working Paper: The Costs and Benefits of Rules of Origin in Modern Free Trade Agreements (2022)
Working Paper: The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:147:y:2024:i:c:s0022199623001605

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103874

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