How to motivate a reviewer with a present bias to work harder

J.A. García, J.J. Montero-Parodi, Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez and J. Fdez-Valdivia

Journal of Informetrics, 2023, vol. 17, issue 4

Abstract: Reviewers with a present bias focus on the here and now, placing more importance on immediate rewards than on future intentions and benefits. In this paper, we are going to address two related research questions: First, can a reviewer's motivation to work hard be increased by using a higher evaluation goal? Second, would a reviewer be more willing to accept a higher evaluation goal if the review process provided a large enough reward? Using a formal model, we predict that a reviewer with a present bias increases their motivation to work hard by setting a higher goal for the manuscript evaluation (relative to having no goal). For example, the reviewer is willing to control the quality of the manuscript, in addition to helping the profession and keeping themselves up to date. However, a reviewer with a severe present bias prefers to exert a low level of effort. In this situation, we find that monetary incentives can play an important role for reviewers. In their absence, a reviewer may not accept the evaluation goal that motivates them to work hard in the peer review process. In this paper, using a series of computational experiments, we discuss the behavior of a reviewer with a present bias and the role of goal intentions and additional instrumental gains.

Keywords: Reviewers; Present bias; Goal intentions; Monetary incentives; Motivation; High effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:infome:v:17:y:2023:i:4:s1751157723000871

DOI: 10.1016/j.joi.2023.101462

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