 Organizational corruption, test score manipulation, and teacher hiring in RomaniaVasile Cernat International Journal of Educational Development, 2024, vol. 105, issue C Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between organized corruption and the irregularities observed in the score distribution of Romania's national teaching hiring and mobility test, which determines eligibility for fixed-term and open-ended teaching positions. Despite its strict scoring rules, there was a significant excess of scores at the critical cut-off values. Both bunching analyses and binomial generalized linear mixed models identified organizational but not individual corruption, as a significant predictor of scoring irregularities at the minimum value required for open-ended positions.Organizational corruption was also associated with a higher probability that scoring precisely at this threshold value would secure an open-ended position. The results further indicated that other factors may contribute to the scoring irregularities at the minimum value required for the less desirable fixed-term positions. Keywords: Corruption; Teacher selection; Test score manipulation; Organizational rule-breaking (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:injoed:v:105:y:2024:i:c:s0738059324000154 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijedudev.2024.102993 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Educational Development is currently edited by Stephen P Heyneman More articles in International Journal of Educational Development from Elsevier |
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