On optimal reinsurance policy with distortion risk measures and premiums

Hirbod Assa

Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2015, vol. 61, issue C, 70-75

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal reinsurance design, when the risk is measured by a distortion risk measure and the premium is given by a distortion risk premium. First, we show how the optimal reinsurance design for the ceding company, the reinsurance company and the social planner can be formulated in the same way. Second, by introducing the “marginal indemnification functions”, we characterize the optimal reinsurance contracts. We show that, for an optimal policy, the associated marginal indemnification function only takes the values zero and one. We will see how the roles of the market preferences and premiums and that of the total risk are separated.

Keywords: Distortion risk measure and premium; Reinsurance optimal policy; Ceding problem; Reinsurance problem; Social planner problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167668714001590
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:insuma:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:70-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2014.11.007

Access Statistics for this article

Insurance: Mathematics and Economics is currently edited by R. Kaas, Hansjoerg Albrecher, M. J. Goovaerts and E. S. W. Shiu

More articles in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().