Financial stability: To regulate or not? A public choice inquiry

Vo Phuong Mai Le, David Meenagh and A. Patrick Minford

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2018, vol. 57, issue C, 127-140

Abstract: The paper takes the stand that the central banks as financial regulators have their own interest in imposing more regulations. It models the institutional behaviour for the central bank and government using the Indirect Inference testing and estimation method and it finds a set of coefficients of the model that can generate the actual observed behaviour for the US. The paper establishes that good monetary policy can reduce instability. Regulation at worse destabilises the economy and at best contributes little to stabilise the economy. After the financial crisis, financial regulations were too severe and thus actually increased instability.

Keywords: DSGE; Regulations; Financial stability; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E10 E58 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:57:y:2018:i:c:p:127-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2018.07.004

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