Target industry takeover competition and the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions: International evidence
Tanveer Hussain and
Gilberto Loureiro
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2023, vol. 89, issue C
Abstract:
This paper studies how target industry takeover competition affects shareholder gains around mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that target industries with higher M&A activity negatively (positively) affect bidder (target) announcement returns, while the impact on bidder-target combined returns is negligible. The results corroborate the overpayment argument of acquiring targets from competitive industries. Importantly, we document that the lower bidder announcement returns associated with higher industry takeover competition are mitigated when bidders are from countries with better institutional quality, suggesting that country governance can prevent bidder managers from overpaying the targets.
Keywords: Industry takeover competition; Mergers and acquisitions; M&A returns, corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s1042443123001336
DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101865
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