 The bind and the slack of Basel III liquidity regulations: Evidence from IndonesiaZaäfri A. Husodo, Arisyi Raz and Dwi Danarsari Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2024, vol. 96, issue C Abstract: Liquidity regulation framework is one of the pillars of Basel III implementation. In this paper, we evaluate how Basel III liquidity regulations, namely the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), as well as their interactions affect financial stability. Theory suggests that, in maintaining financial stability, liquidity regulations may not act as complements. If one regulation is a binding constraint, the other may become a slack. Using Indonesia, an early adopter of the LCR and the NSFR, as a testing ground, we find that the LCR significantly reduces bank systemic risk, thus acting as a binding liquidity regulation. Lower systemic risk reflects lower fire-sale spillover implications in the financial system after the implementation of the LCR. The NSFR, however, does not have a significant effect on systemic risk, confirming its role as a slack. Keywords: Liquidity; Systemic risk; Financial intermediation; Macroprudential regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:96:y:2024:i:c:s1042443124001124 DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102046 Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money is currently edited by I. Mathur and C. J. Neely More articles in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money from Elsevier |
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