Monetary incentives and self-chosen goals in academic performance: An experimental study

Noemí Herranz-Zarzoso and Gerardo Sabater-Grande

International Review of Economics Education, 2018, vol. 27, issue C, 34-44

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of incentive-compatible self-chosen goals on academic performance by means of a randomized field experiment. We use two alternative payment mechanisms, a piece-rate and a rank-order tournament, to motivate students depending on their absolute or relative academic performance respectively. Students enrolled in Introductory Microeconomics were classified in two types depending on whether they had a failed background in this course (returning students) or they had not (new students). Controlling for potential confounding factors such as gender, degree, professor and university entrance grade, we find that both payment mechanisms are effective increasing grades of new and returning students.

Keywords: Self-chosen grades; Monetary incentives; Academic performance; Piece-rate mechanism; Rank-order tournament (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 I21 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ireced:v:27:y:2018:i:c:p:34-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.iree.2018.02.002

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