Deterrence effects under Twombly: On the costs of increasing pleading standards in litigation

Sergio J. Campos, Christopher Cotton and Cheng Li

International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 44, issue C, 61-71

Abstract: We develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study the effects of increased pleading standards on incentives to engage in illegal activity. Such a model is necessary to build intuition about the potential costs of the procedures set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 684 [2009]), which increase the standard of plausibility that lawsuits must meet before being allowed to proceed to discovery and trial. We show how increasing pleading standards tends to increase illegal activity, and can increase litigation costs. Our results provide a counterpoint to the U.S. Supreme Court's argument that increased plausibility requirements decrease the costs of litigation.

Keywords: Judicial procedure; Pleading; Litigation; Deterrence; Litigation costs; Tort law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:44:y:2015:i:c:p:61-71

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.08.005

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