Law enforcement with motivated agents

Ken Yahagi

International Review of Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 66, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides a law enforcement framework through which to consider principal-agent relations among citizens, an elected official, and a law enforcer. This paper investigates how citizens’ interests are reflected in political competitions in terms of the use of financial incentives, e.g., the allocation of fine revenues, to control the intrinsically motivated law enforcer. This paper points out the limitation of using financial incentives to fully internalize society members’ interest in the enforcer's behavior from a normative perspective. Even if appropriate financial incentives are available, these cannot be chosen under political competitions.

Keywords: Financial incentives; Law enforcement; Punitiveness; Intrinsic motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000065

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105982

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