Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria

Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli

International Review of Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 68, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines the credibility of threats to punish criminal offenders. The motivation is the sequential nature of crime and punishment, which unfolds as follows: enforcers threaten punishment, offenders commit crimes (or are deterred), and enforcers (possibly comprising different decision makers) enact punishments. The cost of carrying out threatened punishments after the fact is what potentially undermines the credibility of the initial threat. The model shows that, given the sequential nature of the crime and punishment game, multiple equilibria are possible entailing different crime rates. Changes in law enforcement policy over recent decades are discussed in light of the results.

Keywords: Crime and punishment; Credibility; Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000545

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.106030

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