Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking

Shams Pathan ()

Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, vol. 33, issue 7, 1340-1350

Abstract: This study examines the relevance of bank board structure on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (1534 observations), this study finds that strong bank boards (boards reflecting more of bank shareholders interest) particularly small and less restrictive boards positively affect bank risk-taking. In contrast, CEO power (CEO's ability to control board decision) negatively affects bank risk-taking. These results are consistent with the bank contracting environment and robust to several proxies for bank risk-takings and different estimation techniques.

Keywords: Bank; risk-taking; Board; of; directors; CEO; power; Bank; governance; Bank; holding; companies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (348)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:7:p:1340-1350

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