What do we know about the impact of government interventions in the banking sector? An assessment of various bailout programs on bank behavior
Aneta Hryckiewicz
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, vol. 46, issue C, 246-265
Abstract:
Systemic banking crises have placed enormous pressure on national governments to intervene. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive on what an optimal bailout program should look like to mitigate the negative consequences of government interventions in the banking sector. We find that, in general government interventions have a negative impact on banking sector stability, significantly increasing its risk. In particular, we find that among bailout measures, nationalization and asset management companies (AMCs) contribute most to the risk effect and that among liquidity support mechanisms, public guarantees are the largest contributor to the risk effect. However, we also find that by making an appropriate choice of intervention mechanisms, governments can mitigate the negative consequences stemming from the above-mentioned effects.
Keywords: Government interventions; Crisis; Bailout; Moral hazard; Financial stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614001708
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:46:y:2014:i:c:p:246-265
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.05.009
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().