Explaining serial crowdfunders' dynamic fundraising performance

Ahmed Sewaid, Simon C. Parker and Abdulkader Kaakeh

Journal of Business Venturing, 2021, vol. 36, issue 4

Abstract: This paper investigates serial crowdfunders' performance over successive campaigns. Adopting an expected utility maximization framework in a setting with asymmetric information about hidden entrepreneurial actions and types, we propose that crowdfunding amounts raised will follow a cyclical pattern over successive campaigns. A sample drawn from the population of serial crowdfunders on Kickstarter confirms this prediction and suggests that signaling reputations via the cyclical adjustment of campaign effort may be the mechanism driving it. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Keywords: Serial crowdfunding; Finance; Funds raised; Dynamic panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0883902621000343
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:36:y:2021:i:4:s0883902621000343

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2021.106124

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Venturing is currently edited by S. Venkataraman

More articles in Journal of Business Venturing from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().