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How does the relationship between multiple large shareholders affect corporate valuations? Evidence from China

Minying Cheng, Bingxuan Lin and Minghai Wei

Journal of Economics and Business, 2013, vol. 70, issue C, 43-70

Abstract: This study analyzes how the relationship between non-controlling and controlling large shareholders affects corporate valuations. Using data from the Chinese market, we find that a firm's value is lower when its non-controlling large shareholders have a relationship with its controlling shareholder. In addition, higher ownership stakes and board representation of relational non-controlling large shareholders are associated with lower firm value. This effect is more pronounced when the agency conflicts between the controlling and minority shareholders are greater. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider the identities of non-controlling shareholders when examining the effects of multiple large shareholders on corporate governance or firm value.

Keywords: Multiple large shareholders; Relational shareholders; Firm value; Agency problem; China; Emerging market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:70:y:2013:i:c:p:43-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2012.12.003

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