 Partial environmental tax coordination and political delegationJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2021, vol. 110, issue C Abstract: In the framework of environmental tax competition, this study analyzes the political delegation of tax decisions in oil-producing and oil-importing countries. The main findings are as follows: (i) with uncoordinated tax competition, voters in oil-producing countries typically choose a policymaker who is less green than the median to drive oil prices in their favor, while voters in the oil-importing countries prefer green policymakers over the median; (ii) when oil-producing countries form an oil cartel to coordinate their policies, in anticipation of such coordination, voters elect green policymakers over the median not only in oil-importing countries but also in oil-producing countries; and (iii) policy coordination by oil-producing countries is more likely to be sustained when policy leaders in those countries are exogenous to citizens for reasons such as royal rule, but it is more likely suffer a breakdown when policy leaders are elected. Keywords: Environmental tax competition; Political delegation; Partial tax coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:110:y:2021:i:c:s0095069621001157 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102565 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Environmental Economics and Management is currently edited by M.A. Cole, A. Lange, D.J. Phaneuf, D. Popp, M.J. Roberts, M.D. Smith, C. Timmins, Q. Weninger and A.J. Yates More articles in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management from Elsevier |
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