Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers

Matthew D. Cain, Stephen B. McKeon and Steven Davidoff Solomon

Journal of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 124, issue 3, 464-485

Abstract: This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power.

Keywords: Hostile takeovers; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (108)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:124:y:2017:i:3:p:464-485

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003

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