Board reforms and firm value: Worldwide evidence

Larry Fauver, Mingyi Hung, Xi Li and Alvaro G. Taboada

Journal of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 125, issue 1, 120-142

Abstract: We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that board reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and chief executive officer positions, drive the valuation increases. In addition, while comply-or-explain reforms result in a greater increase in firm value than rule-based reforms, the effects of reforms are similar across civil law and common law countries. Further investigation shows that the subsequent change in board independence plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness of the reforms.

Keywords: Cross-country study; Firm value; Board reforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (110)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X1730079X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:125:y:2017:i:1:p:120-142

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.010

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Economics is currently edited by G. William Schwert

More articles in Journal of Financial Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().