Idea sharing and the performance of mutual funds
Julien Cujean
Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 135, issue 1, 88-119
Abstract:
I develop an equilibrium model to explain why few mutual fund managers consistently outperform, even though many have strong informational advantages. The key ingredient is that managers obtain investment ideas through idea sharing. Idea sharing improves statistical significance of alpha through increased price informativeness. But it also causes better informed managers to take larger positions, which makes their alpha noisier—although a significant fraction of managers builds strong informational advantages, statistical significance and persistence of alpha concentrate in underperforming funds. I argue that in-house development of ideas cannot explain these facts.
Keywords: Idea sharing; Performance; Rational-expectations equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D85 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:135:y:2020:i:1:p:88-119
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.015
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