Activation against absenteeism – Evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Norway

Øystein Hernæs

Journal of Health Economics, 2018, vol. 62, issue C, 60-68

Abstract: I evaluate a program aimed at strictly enforcing a requirement that people on long-term sick leave be partly back at work unless explicitly defined as an exception. Employing the synthetic control method, I find that the reform reduced work-hours lost due to sickness absenteeism by 12% in the reform region compared to a comparison unit created by a weighted average of similar regions. The effect is driven by both increased part-time presence of temporary disabled workers and accelerated recovery. Musculoskeletal disorders was the diagnosis group declining the most. The findings imply large savings in social security expenditures.

Keywords: Absenteeism; Disability; Activation; Workfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Activation against Absenteeism: Evidence from a Sickness Insurance Reform in Norway (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:62:y:2018:i:c:p:60-68

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.09.007

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