Cost of borrowing shocks and fiscal adjustment

Oliver de Groot, Fédéric Holm-Hadulla and Nadine Leiner-Killinger

Journal of International Money and Finance, 2015, vol. 59, issue C, 23-48

Abstract: Do capital markets impose fiscal discipline? To answer this question, we estimate the fiscal response to a change in the interest rate paid by 14 European governments over four decades in a panel VAR, using sign restrictions to identify structural shocks. A jump in the cost of borrowing leads to an improvement in the primary balance although insufficient to prevent a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Adjustment mainly takes place via rising revenues rather than falling primary expenditures. For EMU countries, the primary balance response was stronger after 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, suggesting an important interaction between market discipline and fiscal rules.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Interest rates; Market discipline; Europe; Maastricht Treaty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 E62 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cost of borrowing shocks and fiscal adjustment (2013)
Working Paper: Cost of borrowing shocks and fiscal adjustment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:23-48

DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.09.005

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