Designing fiscal regimes for impact benefit agreements

Cameron Gunton, Thomas Gunton, Joshua Batson, Sean Markey and Daniel Dale

Resources Policy, 2021, vol. 72, issue C

Abstract: •We evaluate alternative impact benefit agreement fiscal instruments using a comprehensive set of criteria.•No fiscal instrument is ideal in terms of fully meeting all criteria.•A multiple account evaluation of revenue and non-revenue provisions of agreements is recommended for assessing trade-offs.•The optimal fiscal regime for impact benefit agreements is likely a hybrid design that uses a combination of fiscal instruments.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:72:y:2021:i:c:s0301420721000210

DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2021.102004

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