Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine

Vasyl Kvartiuk, Thomas Herzfeld and Eduard Bukin

Land Use Policy, 2022, vol. 114, issue C

Abstract: This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.

Keywords: Public land; Land auctions; Hedonic pricing model; Spatial model; Ukraine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Journal Article: Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:114:y:2022:i:c:s0264837722000102

DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983

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