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An improved dynamic game analysis of farmers, enterprises and rural collective economic organizations based on idle land reuse policy

Zhenhua Hu, Gaohui Song, Ziyue Hu and Jiaqi Fang

Land Use Policy, 2024, vol. 140, issue C

Abstract: Land use is a crucial symbol of sustainable development. Rural homestead idleness is problem that is caused by market failure and related to the national economy and people's livelihood. (1) Background: Developing countries should use idle land to develop their economies. The government has introduced various land policies for the reuse of idle residential land to improve the land utilization rate. (2) Methods: This paper investigates players' behavior in reusing rural homesteads based on an improved dynamic game model. An improved tripartite evolutionary game model is developed by introducing principal-agent theory, which is the major contributor to behavioral investigation. MATLAB2022a is used to simulate the analysis to propose countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing homestead reuse. (3) Results: In this paper, it was found that disputes among participants about the sharing of reuse costs and the distribution of potential benefits constituted a potent system of explanatory coordinates that effectively revealed the hidden logic of homestead reuse. The government can strengthen incentives by providing dynamic subsidies linked with individual behavior. (4) Conclusions: Regardless of the initial probability, players will jointly reuse homesteads in the end. Local governments and rural collective economic organizations play an important role in reusing homesteads, so the carrot-and-stick approach supervised by local government is the key to maintaining the stability of cooperation. Moreover, under the concept of sustainable development, governments of all countries actively release the policy of reusing idle land to promote the utilization of resources.

Keywords: Land use; Rural homestead reuse; Principal-agent theory; Tripartite evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:140:y:2024:i:c:s0264837724000504

DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2024.107098

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