An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management

Jesper Raakjær Nielsen

Marine Policy, 2003, vol. 27, issue 5, 425-432

Abstract: In this article an analytical framework for analysing compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management is developed. A precondition for sustainable and efficient fisheries management systems is that the imposed regulations can be controlled and enforced. Furthermore, the management costs shall be reasonable compared to the economic output to be obtained from the fisheries. The analytical framework is based on hypotheses from economic and sociological theories, i.e.: (a) fishers' compliance is determined by economic gains of breaking the rules compared to the risk of being detected, (b) compliance is also determined by the design of the management system and whether the imposed regulations are perceived as legitimate. This relates to both the procedures under which the regulations have been decided and to the contents of the regulations, and (c) institutions play a significant role in coordinating various interests in fisheries management and is further a mean to reduce high transaction costs in fisheries management.

Keywords: Compliance; Fisheries; management; Institutions; Legitimacy; and; transactions; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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