The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Evelyn Pinkerton and Danielle N. Edwards

Marine Policy, 2009, vol. 33, issue 4, 707-713

Abstract: Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.

Keywords: Individual; transferable; quotas; Fisheries; management; Fisheries; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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