Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets

Jingsheng Yu and Jun Zhang

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 100, issue C

Abstract: We consider two variants of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model in which agents’ rights to consume own endowments are restricted but their rights to exchange endowments are unrestricted. In each of the two models, we propose a core notion to characterize allocations that are immune to coalition blocking under such restricted rights. In each model we prove that the corresponding core can be found by a strategy-proof variant of the Top Trading Cycle mechanism. Our results generalize the classical result in the housing market model that the core can be found by the strategy-proof Top Trading Cycle mechanism.

Keywords: Housing market model; Restricted endowment rights; Core; Top trading cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:100:y:2022:i:c:s0304406821001713

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625

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